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1 Introduction
Whenimposingacontrolregime,agovernmentseekstodisplacethemarket
as the primary agency for governing the economy. Either by manipulating
the structure or operation of markets, or by replacing private markets with
publicbureaucracies,itseekstoshapethewayinwhichland,labor,andcapi-
talareallocated;commoditiesproducedanddistributed;servicesfurnished;
and incomes determined.
This chapter details the policies that characterize regulatory regimes and
documentstheireconomicimpact.Stressingtheeconomiccostsinﬂictedby
the imposition of control regimes, the chapter asks: given their magnitude,
why did governments pursue such policies? And having chosen to regulate
theireconomies,whydidgovernmentspersistinthisdecision?Theanswersit
offersnotonlyshedlightonwhygovernmentsmayimposecontrolregimes,
then, but also on the politics of policy reform.
In analyzing the content of control regimes, this chapter draws on two
sets of data. One is the classiﬁcation of policy syndromes developed by
the research teams; the other is an account of the policy choices of twenty-
eightAfricangovernmentspublishedbytheWorldBank(1994).1 Inits1994
report,theBankauditedthemeasurestakenbyitssamplesetofgovernments
to regulate ﬁnancial markets, industries, trade, and services. To illustrate
the content of control regimes, the chapter compares the measures taken
by governments judged to have implemented control regimes with those
judged not to have done so, as documented in the World Bank’s report
(1994).
2 Prices in the macroeconomy
AsshownintheWorldBank’sreport(1994),almostallAfricangovernments
created banks to promote investment in commerce, industry, and agricul-
ture. Governments that imposed control regimes went further, however:
targeting privileged sectors, they actively subsidized the costs of capital for
those who invested in them. To encourage investment, they imposed low
interest rates, either by constraining the lending practices of private banks
or by creating state banks to offer low-cost loans. The result was ﬁnan-
cial repression. As shown in table 4.1, under governments judged to have
imposed control regimes, the mean ex ante real deposit interest rate was
lowerthanundergovernmentswhosepolicieswerejudgedtohaveremained
“syndrome-free.”
1 See World Bank (1994).Domestic interests and control regimes 177
Table 4.1 Ex ante real deposit rate.
Control regimes Other syndromes Syndrome-free
Mean  66.1  309.6  3.9
Median  6.1  4.1  0.3
Count 162 90 165
Table 4.2 Black market premium.
Control regimes Other syndromes Syndrome-free
Mean 175.4 133.6 7.4
Median 53.0 27.0 6.3
Count 317 211 314
Governments that operate outside the CFA zone (or RMA) control the
meansofpayment.Bysettingthepriceatwhichlocalcurrencyexchangesfor
foreign,andthencontrollingtransactionsatthisofﬁcialexchangerate–e.g.
viar emittance requirements for exporters and foreign-exchange rationing
for importers – they can separate local parallel-market prices for traded
goods from international prices. One measure of the magnitude of this
intervention is the level of the black market premium that then prevails in
the market for foreign exchange. As shown in table 4.2,w h e ng o v ernments
imposed control regimes, the mean level of that premium was more than
twice the level of that in economies free of controls.2
3 Interventions by sector
Governments that adopted regulatory regimes were not only more likely to
distortpricesfundamentaltothemacroeconomy;theywerealsomorelikely
to champion sectoral policies.
3.1 The industrial sector
Those that adopted control regimes intervened heavily in the industrial
sector. Data from the World Bank study (1994: 234) suggest that over one-
third secured monopoly rights over mineral production, compared with
one-quarter of those judged “syndrome-free.” Similarly, the World Bank’s
data (1994: 234) indicate that governments that adopted control regimes
2 Given the magnitude of the within-group variance, the difference in means implies an
F-statistic of 5.44, signiﬁcant at the 0.02 level.178 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 4.3 Intervention in food markets.
(number of countries)
Countries that adopt:
Levelo fr estrictions: Control regimes Other
Major 12 2
Limited 5 0
None 4 5
Total 21 7
Source: Data from World Bank (1994: 85).
were half-again more likely to form state monopolies in the cement and
textile industries.
3.2 The agricultural sector
As seen in table 4.3,i n its review of twenty-eight African cases, the World
Banknotedthatone-halfofthegovernmentsjudgedtohaveimposedcontrol
regimes, placed “major” – as opposed to “limited” or “no” – restrictions on
the purchase and sale of staple food crops.
All twenty-eight of the governments studied by the World Bank main-
tained a monopoly over the purchase and export of their country’s major
cash crops. But by artiﬁcially appreciating the value of the domestic cur-
rency, governments that adopted control regimes imposed an additional
level of taxation. As noted in a variety of studies (most notably, perhaps,
in Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1992), the manipulation of the exchange rate
powerfully and adversely impacted upon the earnings of those producing
cash crops for export.
African governments also intervened in the market for food crops: the
WorldBank(1994)reportsthatvirtuallyallofthetwenty-eightgovernments
in its sample imposed “extensive” price controls (1994: 91). The better to
provisionconsumerswithlow-pricedproducts,somegovernmentssecured
monopoly standing in agricultural markets, thus gaining the power to alter
prices. Examples would include the creation of the National Milling Cor-
poration by the government in Tanzania, which purchased and processed
wheatandmaize;theSugarBoardinKenya,whichproducedandprocessed
sugarandregulateditsdistribution;ortheNationalAgriculturalMarketing
Board in Zambia. Table 4.4 reveals that governments that adopted control
regimes more frequently created such marketing agencies than did others.
As noted in studies by Killick (1978), Bates and Collier (1991), and others,3
3 See, for example, Dodge (1977) and the classic reports of William Jones: World Bank
(1975, 1982).Domestic interests and control regimes 179
Table 4.4 Government monopolies in the processing of wheat, maize, sugar,
and vegetable oil.
(number of countries).
Countries that adopt: Wheat Maize Sugar Vegetable oil Total
Control regimes 11 6 12 8 21
Other policies 2 2 4 2 7
Source: Data from: World Bank (1994: 234).
Table 4.5 Government monopoly over the importation of wheat, rice, sugar,
other staples, and vegetable oils.
(number of countries)
Other staple Vegetable
Countries that adopt Wheat Rice Sugar food crops oils Total
Control regimes: 10 13 13 8 8 21
Other policies: 4 4 3 2 2 7
Source: Data from World Bank (1994: 235).
when governments created agricultural marketing boards, they employed
their market power to provision urban consumers with low-priced food.
In efforts to control domestic markets, governments also created public
agencies that purchased food abroad and marketed it domestically. Acquir-
ing foreign exchange at the ofﬁcial rate, the agencies purchased rice, wheat,
and other products abroad, which they placed in the domestic market at
prices lower than those that would have prevailed had the imports been
made by private traders. As seen in table 4.5, the data suggest that such
measures were more likely to have been taken by governments that adopted
regulatory regimes.
To benotedandstressedisthattheﬁnancialburdenofsuchinterventions
was borne by exporters, a portion of whose earnings were appropriated at
the ofﬁcial rate. In many African countries, agricultural products – coffee,
cocoa, cotton, or other cash crops – numbered among the exports that
ﬁnanced these measures.
4 The economic impact
To address the impact of control regimes, we begin by mapping the inci-
denceofthesepoliciesontotheopportunitystructureofAfrica’seconomies.
As seen in 4.6, the governments in landlocked and coastal countries more180 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table4.6 Control regimes and geographic location, 1970–1995.
PercentN umber
Landlocked 52.3 193
Coastal 49.6 183
Resource-rich 38.8 143
Note:B ecause Resource-rich can be either coastal or landlocked, the
total is omitted.
Source: Data supplied by Paul Collier and Stephen A. O’Connell, based
on the classiﬁcation developed in chapter 2.
frequently adopted regulatory policies than did those that were resource-
rich.
Inchapter2,CollierandO’Connellmeasuretheimpactofcontrolregimes
ongrowthratesinAfrica.Controllingfortheimpactofrainfallandﬂuctua-
tionsinthegrowthrateofmajortradingpartnersandintroducingcountry-
speciﬁc effects – to control for such factors as coastal location or resource
endowment – and period effects – to control for the effects of changes in
the global economy, such as resulted from the oil price shocks of the 1970s
and 1980s – Collier and O’Connell ﬁnd that economies subject to control
regimes achieved a median4 growth rate that lay nearly 2 percentage points
below that achieved by economies governed by policies that were judged
“syndrome-free.”
As reported in chapter 3,F o s uand O’Connell (2006) disaggregate the
averageperformanceofAfrica’seconomiesinto“growthspells,”whichthey
then relate to the policy choices of their governments. Deﬁning a growth
collapse as a fall in the three-year centered moving average of growth below
theno-growth(0.0percent)level,theyﬁndthefrequencyofgrowthcollapses
under control regimes to be more than twice that under policy regimes that
remainedsyndrome-free.Deﬁning“medium”growthastheachievementof
a ﬁve-year moving average growth rate of 2.5 percent, Fosu and O’Connell
(2006) ﬁnd that in less than one-quarter of the cases where governments
adopted control regimes did economies attain medium rates of growth; by
contrast,wherepoliciesweresyndrome-free,morethanhalfattainedsucha
growthrate.Theyfurtherﬁndthateconomiesruledbygovernmentswhose
policies remained syndrome-free were more than twice as likely to attain
highgrowthrates–aﬁve-yearmovingaverageof3.5percentormore–than
were those ruled by governments that imposed control regimes.
4 Given the dispersion in the data, they employed a least-absolute rather than a least-squares
deviation criterion, thus dampening the impact of outliers.Domestic interests and control regimes 181
5A closer look
To illuminate the processes that account for the impact of control regimes,
it is useful to movefrom aggregate, cross-nationaldata to materials gleaned
fromcountrystudies.Inthissectionwemakeuseofmaterialsgatheredatthe
micro-level, drawing heavily on the work of the country teams as reported
in volume 2.
5.1 Manufacturing
Seeking to promote industrial development in Tanzania, the government
placed a high priority on securing the local production of consumer prod-
ucts, such as clothing and footwear. The government therefore created the
National Textile Corporation (TEXCO), which invested in a series of mills
that produced cloth, blankets, and packaging, and the Tanzanian Leather
Associated Industries (TLAIA), which invested in the production of shoes.
None of the ﬁrms created by the two agencies operated at a proﬁt. For want
of revenues, their managers skimped on maintenance; they lacked access
to the foreign exchange with which to import spare parts. The managers
frequently failed to pay suppliers of raw materials, of services, or of the
water and electricity necessary to drive looms and lathes. The ﬁrms sur-
vivedb ys ecuring loans from the government: funneling money into the
shoe plants, one minister declared, “was like pouring water down in a leak-
ing tin” (McHenry 1994). Despite the poor performance of these ﬁrms,
the government continued to make good their losses. From 1967, the date
of Tanzania’s ofﬁcial commitment to socialism, to 1982, when that com-
mitment began to erode, public sector ﬁrms in Tanzania increased their
share of total manufacturing employment from 15.5 percent to 52.7 per-
cent. Fearing to lay off the thousands of workers that these ﬁrms employed
(McHenry1994),thegovernmentcontinuedtousepublicrevenuestocover
their deﬁcits.
As noted in the country studies in volume 2, Tanzania’s experience was
replicatedbythatinothernations.AddressingthecaseofZambia,forexam-
ple,MwanawinaandMulungushi(2007)tracethegovernment’sinvestments
in factories for the making of glass, the fabrication of building materials,
the extrusion of plastics, and the assembly of automobiles. Quoting Turok
(1979: 24) they note that “the parastatal sector, the main arm of govern-
ment economic muscle, were grossly undercapitalized, over staffed, and
faced shortages of raw materials and spare parts due to lack of foreign
exchange” (2007: 18). Gogu´ e and Evlo (2007)r ecount the efforts of the
government of Togo: “Public investment represented nearly half of GDP
by the end of the 1970s,” they note (2005: 16). The government of Togo,182 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Gogu´ e and Evlo (2007)r ecord, launched its program of industrialization
following the inﬂux of foreign revenues inspired by a boom in the price
of phosphates. Similar stories are told for Cameroon and Congo (Kobou,
Njinkeu, and Powo Fosso 2007;T sassa and Yamb 2007); Burundi (Nkurun-
ziza and Ngaruko 2007); Zambia (Mwanawina and Mulungushi 2007), and
Sierra Leone (Davies 2007). As in the case of Tanzania, these investments
often consumed more resources than they generated. Writing of the indus-
tries created by the government of Burundi, for example, Nkurunziza and
Ngaruko (2007) note:
By 1995, equity capital of thirty-six such ﬁrms with majority state participation
represented20percentofthecountry’sGDP,butoverall,thesecorporationsposted
an et loss equivalent to 6 percent of GDP. (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2007: 35)
5.2 Public services
Governments that imposed control regimes recruited large numbers of
workers. Tsassa and Yamb (2007)r eport, for example, that the government
of the Republic of the Congo increased the size of the public work force by
an average of 9 percent per year from 1960 to 1993. Samba Mamadou and
Yakoubou(2007)reporta4percentannualincreaseinthegovernmentwork
force in Niger over the period 1980–92, while Gogu´ e and Evlo (2007) note
a three-fold increase in public sector employment in Togo over the period
1965–79.InNiger,Cameroon,Congo,Guinea,andBenin,thecountrystud-
ies inform us, in the 1960s and 1970s all who secured their diplomas were
guaranteed employment by the state.5
Tsassa and Yamb (2007)r eport that by the early 1990s, 97 percent of
the receipts of the government of the Congo were targeted for civil servant
salaries. One way of relieving the burden was simply to accumulate arrears;
the country studies suggest that this tactic was adopted by many of the gov-
ernments in the franc zone. Where governments could exercise monetary
discretion,theyoftenreducedtheburdenbyinﬂatingthecurrency.Accord-
ing to the International Labour Organization (ILO), in Tanzania, the real
salaries of public employees fell by nearly one-half between 1969 and 1980
(citedinMcHenry1994,table4.1).InherstudyofworkersinKinshasa,Mac-
Gaffey(1991)reportsthatmid-1980ssalariesconstitutedlessthanone-half
of the incomes of those who worked in the public sector.
One of the major effects of the reduction of salaries was the growth
of corruption. Charged with preventing the importation of products that
weremanufacturedlocally,acustomsofﬁcialcouldinsteadwavesuchgoods
through, pocketing a fee for his “service.” Or charged with overseeing the
5 Note the relevant country case studies. They are posted at http://www.aercAfrica.org.Domestic interests and control regimes 183
Table 4.7 Distribution of growth performance, by syndrome.
(% of row)
Panel A: three-year moving average
Syndrome status < 0 >=0T otal
Not-free 49.3 50.7 100
Syndrome-free 19.1 80.9 100
Total 39.5 60.5 100
Panel B: ﬁve-year moving average
Syndrome status <2.5 >=2.5 Total
Not-free 75.9 24.1 100
Syndrome-free 47.5 52.6 100
Total 66.7 33.3 100
Panel C: ﬁve-year moving average
Syndrome status <3.5 >=3.5 Total
Not-free 80.7 19.3 100
Syndrome-free 55.8 44.2 100
Total 72.6 27.4 100
pricing of products produced at home, an inspector could share with
the managers of ﬁrms the proﬁts to be made from selling those products on
theblackmarket.Theresultwastheerosionofthequalityofpublicservices
and the rise of corruption.
5.3 Farming
Governments that imposed control regimes formed monopsonies with
which to purchase export crops; offering farmers a low domestic price,
they re-sold cash crops at prices prevailing in global markets. Dossou and
Sinzogan, with Mensah (2007)d ocument the cartelization of the cotton
industry in Benin and its subsequent take over by the government. They
also document the government’s use of its market power to separate the
domestic from the international price of cotton and to appropriate a major
portion of the differential. Azam and Djimto¨ ıngar (2007) note a similar
pattern in Chad, where the government not only imposed a direct tax on
farmers but also a proﬁt tax on the reserves of the cotton agency. By dint
of the government’s ownership of 75 percent of the shares of the parastatal,
the majority of the proﬁts also accrued to the government. Nkurunziza
and Ngaruko (2007)p rovide a similar narrative for the coffee industry in
Burundi;SambaMamadouandYakoubou(2007)forthegroundnutindus-
try inN i g e r ; and Davies (2007) for coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone. As
stated by Gogu´ e and Evlo (2005):184 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
The producer price of key export crops fell considerably (40% in the case of cocoa
and 20% in the case of coffee) despite the increase in the international prices of
these commodities. The power of the agencies created to implement the price con-
trol policies (OPAT, Togograin, Togofruit, etc.) grew bigger, as did the anti-rural
bias of the government’s income distribution policy. At the same time, ﬂattering
and deceiving slogans that boasted the merits of the Green Revolution and through
which the government conveniently conveyed its demagogical rhetoric lulled farm-
ers.Indeed,Togoleseheardsomuchaboutsomethingcalled“theGreenRevolution”
but they never experienced [it] actually. The beautiful words and great promises of
the government were not followed by concrete actions. (2005: 36)
Similarpatternsaroseinmarketsforfoodcrops.InTanzania(Mwaseand
Ndulu 2007), Mozambique (de Sousa and Sulemane 2007), and Ethiopia
(Alemayehu 2007), governments gathered farmers into villages, where they
provided land, tools, and credit. With farm production now concentrated
incircumscribedlocations,thegovernmentssoughttocontrolthepurchase
anddistributionoffarmproducts,funnelingthemthrough“single-channel”
marketing structures, such as marketing boards or cooperative societies.
They thereby sought to procure for urban consumers ample supplies of
food at affordable prices. The result of this policy was, however, the oppo-
site. As documented for Guinea by Doumbouya and Camara (2007) and
for Tanzania by Lofchie (1989), as the bureaucracy charged with procur-
ing grain increased in scope and size, the amount of grain that it marketed
declined. One interpretation is that production itself declined; given the
forceful relocation of peasant families from private farms to collective vil-
lages, this interpretation may be correct. Another is that when confronted
with an ofﬁcial market offering low prices for farm products, the producers
simply sold their products in unofﬁcial markets, thereby eluding those who
monitored the quantities and regulated the prices of agricultural products.
ThelatterpossibilityisconﬁrmedbyDoumbouyaandCamara(2007),who
report the growth of black markets in Guinea and the movement of pro-
ducers to regions by the border, where they could sell food crops in private
markets and at unofﬁcial rates of exchange. Indeed, in their study of Benin,
Dossou and Sinzogan, with Mensah (2007)s tress the size of the illicit trade
in food products with Nigeria, where “Dutch disease” had led to high food
prices.
Writing about Mozambique, Pitcher (2002) notes similar patterns. In
the southern portion of Mozambique, the formation of communal villages
so disrupted production that shortages of food and high prices for farm
products became painfully common in the port cities and national capital,
even while the welfare of the peasantry declined (see also Bowen 2000).
Indeed, it declined to the point, Pitcher notes, where signiﬁcant portions of
the peasantry shifted their support from the Mozambican Liberation Front
(FRELIMO), the governing party, to the Mozambican National ResistanceDomestic interests and control regimes 185
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Figure 4.1 Policy regimes over time, 1965–1995
(RENAMO), an armed movement sworn to its forceful overthrow (see also
Schutz 1995;H all and Young 1997).
6T emporal and political correlates
This section depicts the incidence of control regimes, comparing the fre-
quencywithwhichtheywereadopted,bytimeperiodandbytypeofpolitical
system. The pattern of variation points to forces that may account for the
selectionofsuchpolicies–andthus,too,fortheirsubsequentabandonment.
As seen in ﬁgure 4.1,g overnments in the mid-1970s through to the mid-
1980s were more likely to adopt control regimes than were governments in
the 1960s or 1990s.
As seen in ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3,c ontrol regimes were more likely to be
adopted by authoritarian governments: those based on no-party govern-
ments or single-party systems (ﬁgure 4.2)o r military regimes (ﬁgure 4.3).
Governments in countries with competitive political systems (ﬁgure 4.2)
and civilian regimes (ﬁgure 4.3)w ere more likely to adopt policies judged
“syndrome-free.”6
Noto nly has the choice of policy syndromes varied over the post-
independence period; so too has the structure of political institutions (ﬁg-
ures 4.4 and 4.5). In particular, single-party systems became increasingly
scarce and competitive systems more common toward the end of the twen-
tieth century.
6 The relationship between policy choice and political institutions is statistically signiﬁcant
in all cases.186 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
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Figure 4.3 Military government and policy regime
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1970–4 1975–9 1980–4 1985–9 1990–5
%
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
No-party
One-party
Multi-party
Figure 4.4 Partys ystems over time, 1970–1995Domestic interests and control regimes 187
Table 4.8 The variables.
Number of
observations Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Control regime 1,196 0.510 0.501 0 1
Syndrome-free 1,163 0.251 0.434 0 1
No-party system 1,196 0.313 0.463 0 1
Single-party system 1,196 0.392 0.483 0 1
Regional polarization 1,118 0.372 0.484 0 1
Privileged region 1,195 0.891 0.311 0 1
President from the non-privileged region 977 0.570 0.495 0 1
Socialism 1,115 0.289 0.450 0 1
Military head of state 1,103 0.441 0.497 0 1
Cold War 1,196 0.692 0.462 0 1
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Figure 4.5 Military governments over time, 1970–1995
Because both policy choices and institutions have co-varied with time,
the relationship between them may, of course, be spurious. To address this
concern, we therefore turn to multivariate analysis. Table 4.8 describes the
variables employed in subsequent models.
As demonstrated in table 4.9,w hen period dummies are entered into the
equation, the relationship between type of political system and the choice
of policy regime remains signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients of these dummies
capture the temporal pattern of policy choice, with the period before 1975
formingthereferencecategory.Theestimatesincolumns(1)and(3)conﬁrm
that governments were more likely to adopt control regimes during the
1970s and 1980s and that they became signiﬁcantly less likely to adopt such
policies in the 1990s. The coefﬁcients in columns (2) and (4) suggest that
thetrajectorymarkingtheadoptionofsyndrome-freepolicy-makingtraced
a mirror image of that traced by the adoption of control regimes.188 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 4.9 Patterns of policy-making.
(conditional logistic estimation)
Control regime Syndrome-free Control regime Syndrome-free
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
No-party system 0.628  1.208
(3.56)   (6.62)  
Single-party system 0.688  2.021
(4.05)   (10.16)  
Cold War 0.902  0.480 1.096  0.983
(6.41)   (2.98)   (7.76)   (6.19)  
Military head of state 0.488  1.676
(3.80)   (9.61)  
Constant  1.046 0.365  0.920 0.189
(6.82)   (2.49)  (6.88)   (1.38)
Observations 1092 1071 1059 1038
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 5%;    signiﬁcant at 1%.
Of particular interest, however, are the coefﬁcients on the institutional
measures. In columns (1) and (2), the dummy variable indicating the pres-
enceofacompetitivepoliticalsystemissubsumedbytheconstantterm.The
coefﬁcients on the “no-party” and “single-party” variables indicate that the
adoption of control regimes is signiﬁcantly associated with the structure of
political competition and that non-competitive systems were far less likely
to adopt policies judged to be “syndrome-free.” In columns (3) and (4),
the coefﬁcient on the variable indicating a military head of state suggests
that military governments were signiﬁcantly more likely to impose control
regimes than were civilian. Taken together, the estimates in table 4.9 thus
suggest a relationship between authoritarian forms of government and a
preference for regulatory regimes.
6.1 A closer look
6.1.1 Early adopters
TheﬁrstcountriestoadoptcontrolregimesincludedtheWestAfricanstates
of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali and East African nations such as Tanzania and
Uganda. They also included Congo (Brazzaville). The leaders of these gov-
ernments viewed themselves as socialist and adopted much of the language
and some of the institutions of command-and-control economies.
As noted in the country studies in volume 2, socialist governments
imposed control regimes. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) that ruledDomestic interests and control regimes 189
GhanaunderKwameNkrumahlistedamongitsobjectivesthecreationof“a
Socialist State [sic]i nw hich all men and women shall have equal opportu-
nity and where there will be no capitalist exploitation” (Aryeetey and Fosu
2005).TherulingpartiesofTanzania,Zambia,andUgandaadopted“African
socialist” manifestos in the mid-1960s; while the Movement National de la
R´ evolution,thegoverningpartyintheRepublicofCongo,formerlyendorsed
Marxism–Leninism in 1968 (Tsassa and Yamb 2007), as did the Parti de la
R´ evolution Populaire in Benin and FRELIMO in Mozambique in the mid-
1970s. In each case, the result was the imposition of control regimes. As
noted by Dossou and Sinzogan, with Mensah (2007: 3–4) in their study
of Benin, when “socialism was proclaimed as the ‘route to development’
and Marxism–Leninism the ‘philosophical guide,’ then there began a pol-
icy of ‘planiﬁcation’ with ambitious objectives.” And the state then became
“omnipotent . . . with little regard for the interests of the private sector.”
The commitment of governments to socialist policies at home was
matched by a commitment to non-alignment abroad. As evidenced most
vividly, perhaps, by the Congo (Kinshasa) crisis, almost immediately after
independence in the early 1960s, the global conﬂict between capitalism and
socialism intruded into the politics of Africa. The independence that its
nations had just won now appeared threatened. The states that adopted
controlregimesnumberedamongthosewhomostvigorouslyprotestedthe
intrusion of the great powers and advocated a policy of non-alignment in
global affairs.
These governments also numbered among the most active opponents of
the minority regimes that clung to power in Southern Africa. They chan-
neledfundstoliberationmovements;maintainedschoolsinwhichpolitical
activists could learn from the histories of the liberation struggles in China,
Algeria,andVietnam;andgaveasylumtoleaderswhofacedjail–orworse–
at home. Several provided bases where military units could train in prepa-
ration for re-deployment to their homelands.
The choice of economic policies by these “early adopters” of control
regimes thus ﬁts into a broader proﬁle. The governments that adopted con-
trolregimesstoodamongthechartermembersoftheso-called“Casablanca
group.”TheysoughtAfrica’sliberationandchampionedthecauseofAfrican
unity.Theiradoptionofinterventionisteconomicpoliciesappearstoreﬂect
their determination to transform the continent.
6.1.2 Embattled reformers
As noted in ﬁgure 4.1, the frequency with which governments adopted
regulatory regimes increased from roughly 30 percent at the end of the
1960stoover60percentbytheendofthe1970s.Onereasonforthisincrease
was the tendency of regimes that were, quite literally, embattled to regulate
their economies. Both Ethiopia and Somalia – two nations ﬁghting each190 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 4.10 Ideology and patterns of policy-making.
(conditional logistic estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Control regime Syndrome-free Control regime Syndrome-free
No-party system 0.751  1.186
(1.78) (2.67)  
Single-party system 1.105  0.885
(2.48)  (2.14) 
Socialist 2.484  2.455 2.731  2.533
(4.70)   (4.84)   (5.24)   (4.79)  
Cold War 2.753  1.791 3.007  2.429
(8.48)   (5.38)   (9.06)   (6.92)  
Military head of state 0.736  2.414
(1.84) (5.23)  
Observations 641 562 631 555
Number of countries 26 23 26 23
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 5%;    signiﬁcant at 1%.
other – adopted socialist ideologies and imposed control regimes in order
to mobilize for war. To these nations could be added Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau, whose military forces in the mid-1970s defeated those
of Portugal. The governments of these nations sought to over-ride market
forcesinordertomobilizeforwar.Addingfurtherimpetustotheirdecision
wasthedesireofsometosignaltheirgoodfaithtosocialistcountriesabroad
and thereby attract military and ﬁnancial backing.7
Table4.10capturestherelationshipbetweentheideologicalcommitment
of the government in power and the pattern of policy-making.
7 The politics of economics
This section has two parts. The ﬁrst addresses a paradox that has lurked
just beneath the surface of the discussion thus far: the seeming willingness
of socialist governments, with their commitment to economic equality, to
7 In other instances, it is difﬁcult to detect systematic reasons for the adoption of control
regimes. In the case of Kenya, the reasons appear to derive from anxiety concerning food
supplies; in that of the Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, they appear to be associated with the launching of
agricultural projects and industrial schemes following the coffee boom of the mid-1970s.
Rwanda, Chad, and Burundi may belong to the class of “embattled” regimes; Senegal,
Madagascar, and Mauritius (1960–70) do not. In such instances, the reasons remain as
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undermine the well-being of peasants, the poorest of the poor in Africa.
Untanglingthisparadoxclariﬁestheroleofpoliticalinterestsintheselection
of government policies. The second illustrates the importance of pressures
for redistribution, which also appear to promote the adoption of control
regimes.
7.1 A fruitful paradox
Asseenintable4.10,socialistgovernmentsinAfricatendtoimposecontrol
regimes.Theythereforetendtoadoptpoliciesthatlowertheeconomicwell-
beingofthepeasantry,thepoorestoftheircitizens,andthosethereforewith
themostcompellingclaimforpublicassistance.8Addressingthedisjuncture
betweenthevaluesandthechoicesofsocialistgovernmentsbringsintosharp
focus the political forces that drive policy choices.
The discussion can proceed in several quick steps.
7.1.1 In general
The core of Africa’s political regimes was composed of the government,
industry, and organized labor.W hile accounting for less than 40 percent of
theGDPofatypicalAfricanstateandlessthan20percentofthepopulation,
these urban-based interests nonetheless dominated policy-making in the
post-independence period:
Governmentsprovideservicesand,forthemostpart,publicservicesremain
un-priced.Theirbiggestcostislabor.Todefendtheirbudgets,governments
therefore adopt policies that lowered the cost of labor.
Industries employ capital and labor to produce commodities. All else being
equal,adecreaseinthecostsoflaborresultsinanincreaseinproﬁts.Industry
thereforejoinsgovernmentinfavoringpoliciesthatlowerthecostsoflabor.
Labor favors policies that defend the real value of workers’ incomes. Given
the income of most wage earners in Africa, workers devote a large portion
of their expenditures to food.
In seekingtorewardthecorecoalition,governmentsthereforechampioned
policies that secured low priced food.
7.1.2 In particular
Socialist governments were tightly integrated with the other portions of the
core coalition:
8 This tendency has been noted by others. See, for example, Mitrany (1961).192 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Socialist governments were more likely to nationalize existing ﬁrms and
to invest in new industries than were others. To a greater degree than other
governments,theirintereststhereforealignedwiththoseofindustrialﬁrms.
Socialist governments aspired to the provision of higher levels of health
care, education, and other services than did most other governments. As a
result, they hired more workers.
As a matter of principle, socialist governments endorsed the interests of
workers. And as a matter of practice, socialist parties maintained close ties
with organized labor and trade unions based in both private industry and
the public services.
Socialistgovernmentsthereforepossessedastronginterestinadoptingpoli-
cies that lowered the costs of food, even though lowering the incomes of
farmers.
The policies that enabled socialist regimes to consolidate their core con-
stituency violated their ideological commitments. That they did so testiﬁes
to the power of the political interests that dominated policy-making in the
post-independence period. These industries were urban-based, industry-
based, and located in the towns, and they possessed close ties to regimes in
power.
Having limned the political foundations of control regimes, a second
question arises: given the economic costs of these policies, why did govern-
ments not abandon them? To comprehend this delay, one need ask only:
wouldanymemberofthegoverningcoalitionhaveanincentiveunilaterally
to call upon the government to abandon them? More speciﬁcally: would
any single player – industry, organized labor, or the government itself –
beneﬁt by calling for higher prices for farmers? The answer is of course:
“no.”N op olitician would voluntarily defect from the ruling coalition, no
ﬁrm unilaterally agree to higher costs, no trade unionist call for changes
that would lower the incomes of labor. While socially costly, the choice of
policies constituted an equilibrium.
7.2 Regional redistribution
Control regimes were employed for purposes of redistribution. Already
noted is their use by governments to extract resources from rural dwellers
andtotransferthemtourban-basedindustries.Equallyimportant,itwould
appear, is the use of these policies to transfer resources between regions.
AsnotedbyTsassaandYamb(2007),politicsintheRepublicoftheCongo
is marked by rivalries between the poorly endowed North and the relatively
prosperous South. Following the “Three Glorious Days” of August 1963,
a“ C o nseil National de la R´ evolution” (CNR) took power and committed
the government to building a socialist state. In pursuit of that objective, it
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competitive prices, the center collected taxes from the North. Tsassa and
Yamb (2007) note that to defend its monopoly position from new entrants
and competitors, the bureaucracies drew on the power of both the army
and police. In 1968, the military forcefully seized power. Headed by Marien
Ngouabi, a Northerner, the ruling junta then began to install people from
the North to key posts throughout the military, the government, and the
parastatal sector. Politics was a matter of regional redistribution.
Togo provides another example (Gogu´ e and Evlo 2007). Northern Togo
is semi-arid, poor, and relatively unpopulated. The South produces the pri-
mary cash crops and contains the phosphate deposits that generate the
majority of Togo’s foreign exchange. It also contains the majority of Togo’s
population and, for historical reasons, a disproportion of its educated per-
sonnel.Mostactiveportionsoftheindependencemovementhadoriginated
in the South, and it was a Southerner, Sylvanus Olympio, who became
Togo’s ﬁrst President. In 1963, however, the military seized ofﬁce. Gnass-
ingb´ eE y a d´ ema was Olympio’s rival and after a four-year interval he seized
thepresidency.Gnassingb´ ecamefromKara,adistrictintheNorth.Through
a mixture of inducement and intimidation – heavily balanced toward the
latter–herenderedthestateameansofextractingresourcesfromtheSouth
to the beneﬁt of himself and his Northern constituency.
Recalling the Kobou, Njinkeu, and Powo Fosso (2007) analysis of
Cameroon, the discussion of Malawi by Chipeta and Mkandawire (2007),
andMwegaandNdung’u’s(2007)portrayalofKenya,wegainakeenappre-
ciationoftheextenttowhichregionalcompetitiondrivespoliticsinAfrica–
and the policy choices of its governments.
Table 4.11 illustrates the relationship between policy choice and regional
inequality. The variable “Privileged region” takes the value 1 when a nation
exhibits a high level of regional inequality and 0 when it does not. The
coefﬁcient suggests that when there is a privileged region, governments are
more likely to impose control regimes and less likely to adopt policies that
are “syndrome-free.” Note, too, the coefﬁcient on the variable “Polarized
region.” A privileged region is coded as polarized when it is ethnically and
religiously homogenous and distinctive. The coefﬁcient suggests that cul-
turaluniformityanddistinctivenessaddtotheimpactofregionalinequality,
producing a stronger tendency to introduce control regimes.
Table 4.12 suggests that in countries where the chief executive is from
ar egion that is relatively poor, governments are again more likely to
adopt control regimes (column (1)) and less likely to adopt policies that
remain syndrome-free (column (2)). The coefﬁcient in column (1) is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient in column (3), moreover, suggests that
when the presidency shifts from a privileged to a non-privileged region,
then the government is signiﬁcantly more likely to impose regulatory
controls.194 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 4.11 Regional differentiation and patterns of policy-making.
(logistic estimation, pooled sample).
Control regime Syndrome-free Control regime Syndrome-free
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
No-party system 0.566  1.339
(2.97)   (5.79)  
Single-party system 0.485  1.478
(2.50)  (6.36)  
Privileged region 1.505  2.410 1.530  2.640
(5.44)   (8.16)   (5.78)   (9.02)  
Polarized region 0.599  1.215 0.573  0.814
(3.81)   (5.65)   (3.66)   (3.81)  
Socialist 1.524  1.779 1.391  1.704
(8.54)   (6.41)   (7.75)   (6.09)  
Cold War 0.994  0.601 1.118  1.051
(6.28)   (3.16)   (7.15)   (5.51)  
Military head of state 0.277  1.742
(1.90) (8.47)  
Constant  2.771 3.033  2.592 3.086
(9.54)   (9.54)   (9.36)   (9.76)  
Observations 1041 1041 1003 1003
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 5%;    signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4.13 reports marginal effects, thus enabling us to gain a sense of
the magnitude of the coefﬁcients contained in table 4.12.T he coefﬁcients
conﬁrm the importance of party competition; in its absence, the likeli-
hoodofadoptingacontrolregimeorofabandoningsyndrome-freepatterns
of policy-making rises by about 20 percentage points. Regional inequality
increases the likelihood of control regimes by about 15 percentage points;
cultural polarization adds an additional 20 percentage points. The impact
of these variables is both less and less precisely estimated under military
governments than when there are civilian regimes. The results also conﬁrm
the arguments of Mwase and Ndulu (2007): both ideology and “the times”
appear to have a signiﬁcant impact upon patterns of policy-making.
7.3 Discussion
Thepoliticalforcesthatunderpinthechoiceofcontrolregimesthusappear
to arise from three sources. One is ideology. High levels of government
intervention occur when governments ﬁnd principled reasons for over-
riding the allocations generated by markets. A second is the power ofDomestic interests and control regimes 195
Table 4.12 Presidential origin and patterns of policy-making.
(logistic estimation, pooled sample).
Control regime Syndrome-free Control regime Syndrome-free
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
No-party system 0.532  1.482
(2.29)  (5.76)  
Single-party system 0.585  1.625
(2.55)  (6.40)  
President from the 0.743  0.214 0.806  0.123
non-privileged region (4.44)   (1.05) (4.63)   (0.60)
Socialist 1.823  1.506 1.697  1.558
(8.85)   (5.41)   (8.12)   (5.52)  
Polarized region 1.001  1.069 0.987  0.678
(5.76)   (4.93)   (5.65)   (3.19)  
Cold War 1.023  0.568 1.189  1.026
(5.76)   (2.74)   (6.85)   (5.20)  
Military head of state  0.172  1.374
(1.01) (6.22)  
Constant  1.924 0.831  1.519 0.376
(7.98)   (3.67)   (7.41)   (1.83)
Observations 853 853 820 820
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 5%;    signiﬁcant at 1%.
organized interests. In a political world in which governments need not
competeforthesupportofabroadelectorate,interestgroupsconstitutethe
primary means by which political preferences shape policy choices. And in
ag ame best characterized as the interplay of political interests, it is those
that are organized that prevail. The third is regional inequality. It generates
incentives to adopt policies designed to overcome the economic impact of
disparate endowments and to create political institutions with the power to
elicit the transfer of resources. Authoritarianism; demands for redistribu-
tion between town and country, rich region and poor; and governmental
intervention in markets – these tendencies co-vary. They appear to have
shapedthepoliticalconductandeconomicperformanceofgovernmentsin
post-independence Africa.
8C onclusion
This analysis not only furnishes insight into the political logic underlying
control regimes but also into the politics of late-twentieth-century reform.196 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 4.13 Marginal effects on patterns of policy-making.
(logistic estimation, pooled sample).
Control regime Syndrome-free Control regime Syndrome-free
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
No-party system 0.191  0.180
(4.22)  (7.29)  
Single-party system 0.221  0.226
(4.76)  (7.62)  
President from the 0.151  0.021 0.176  0.012
non-privileged region (4.00)   (0.82) (4.53)   (0.48)
Socialist 0.372  0.129 0.363  0.177
(12.33)   (5.48)   (11.85)   (8.20)  
Polarized region 0.224  0.163 0.217  0.087
(6.43)   (7.28)   (6.20)   (3.64)  
Cold War 0.221  0.19 0.196  0.186
(6.68)   (5.00)   (5.56)   (5.82)  
Military head of state  0.025  0.178
(0.64) (6.58)  
Constant  1.924 0.831  1.519 0.376
(7.98)   (3.67)   (7.41)   (1.83)
Observations 853 853 820 820
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 5%;    signiﬁcant at 1%.
As noted in chapter 9,w ith the end of the Cold War global opinion swung
in favor of free market policies and competitive political systems. An impli-
cation of the arguments in this chapter is that these economic and political
reforms of necessity took place together.
When contemplating this proposition, it is useful to cite three cases. The
ﬁrst is policy change in Mozambique; the second, policy reform in Ghana;
and the third, policy-making in Botswana.
Mozambique’s peasantry faced costs of organizing as high as those faced
by the peasantry in other countries. But RENAMO based itself in the rural
areas when mounting its armed opposition to the government. RENAMO
could successfully operate in the rural areas because it drew logistical sup-
port from abroad. What support many peasants could give, however, they
did give, and FRELIMO, the governing party, faced the prospect of losing
their political allegiance, given its insistence on measures that the peasants
opposed (Schultz 1976;H all and Young 1997; Pitcher 2002). One reason
that FRELIMO relaxed and then abandoned its commitment to villagiza-
tion was that the policies fueled support for RENAMO, its political rival.Domestic interests and control regimes 197
Elsewherepeasantslackedsuchanadvocate–organized,armed,andableto
resist the governing party – and governments had less reason to alter their
policies.
First as a military ruler and then as a head of a single party regime,
Rawlings deployed his security services in Ghana to impose price controls,
shut down black markets, and evacuate crops from the countryside for sale
in urban markets. In face of these policies, the economy still failed to grow
and the government began to contemplate abandoning its dirigiste policies.
ForRawlings,abandoningacontrolregimewastantamounttoabandoning
his urban-based, industry-based, class-based constituency and the socialist
principles that legitimated his policy commitments.
The solution that Rawlings devised is notable. To defend his political
future while altering his public policies, Rawlings had to build a rural base
for his governing party. Beginning by organizing village political commit-
teesmannedbypoliticalmilitants,hethenintroducedelectedlocalcouncils.
When he later introduced elections for the parliament and presidency, he
had therefore already put in place political organizations throughout the
townships and villages. Given the structure of Ghana’s economy and the
composition of its population, rural voters outnumbered urban. For Rawl-
ings,democratizationthereforeprovidedameansofshiftingfromanurban-
based constituency, which was hurt by economic reform, to a rural political
base, which beneﬁted from them. It provided a means of surviving politi-
callywhileabandoningacontrolregime(LeithandLofchie1991;R othchild
1991, 1995; Shillington 1992;H e r bst 1993;O q u a y e1995;G yimah-Boadi
1998; and Aryeetey and Fosu 2007).
If Ghana provides evidence that the abandonment of control regimes
creates incentives for political reform, then Botswana provides evidence of
how open political competition creates incentives to avoid the extractive
policies in the ﬁrst place. As stated by Maipose and Matsheka (2007):
Theleadershipintherulingpartyhadconsiderableinterestinpromotingtheirown
version of good government. Because the government knew that it must stand for
election every ﬁve years, the ruling party pursued policies it believed would gain it
the political support necessary to defeat its opponents, seeking “proﬁt” in the form
of“politicalincome.”Theprioritiesofthekeyruraldevelopmentprograms,suchas
theArableLandDevelopmentProgrammeandtheAcceleratedRuralDevelopment
Programme, initiated during this period, and attention given to the cattle industry,
were not biased against rural areas. (2007: 10)
Control regimes can not be sustained when policy results from competi-
tionbetweenpoliticianswhohadeveryreasontobidforpoliticalmajorities.
In Africa, farmers constitute that majority, and their interests are violated
by these policies.198 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
The introduction of political competition and the abandonment of con-
trol regimes thus went together in late-twentieth-century Africa.
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